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AFTER BILLIONS SPENT TO COMPLY WITH HIPAA AND GLBA
PRIVACY PROVISIONS, WHY IS IDENTITY THEFT THE
MOST PREVALENT CRIME IN AMERICA?
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Nature of the Crime
Our identities are crucial in conducting our day-to-day transactions.
In order to identify us, a majority of institutions use a series of numbers to
confirm our identities.1 Identity theft is the largest and fastest growing
crime in the United States.2 Recently, the instances of identity theft have
risen rapidly.3 Identity theft causes considerable monetary damage be-
cause its victims do not realize they are victims for quite some time.4 In
1. See Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the In-
formation Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB.
POL'y 661, 665 (1999) (noting importance of one's identity and fact that imper-
sonal numbers, words and other identifiers are all that are needed to prove one's
identity).
2. See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 7 (Sept. 2003), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (finding
that 4.6 percent of American adults have been victims of identity theft and extrapo-
lating this data to estimate that 9.91 million Americans have been victims of iden-
tity theft in past year); FTC, OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTITY THEFT PROGRAM 8 (Sept.
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/timelinereport.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FTC OVERVIEW] (reporting that complaints filed with FTC Identity Theft
Clearinghouse rose from 31,117 annually in 2000 to 131,022 as of July 31, 2003);
see also The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act: Hearing on S. 512 Before the
Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism and Gov't Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 3 (1998) (statement of Mari J. Frank) (stating that one in four Americans
has been victimized by identity theft); id. (opening statement of Chairman Jon Kyl)
(stating that Secret Service arrests in 1997 involved crimes that cost financial insti-
tutions $745 million in losses); 147 CONG. REc. S12162 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2001)
(statement of Ms. Cantwell) (stating that one in five Americans has either been
victim of identity theft or has family member who has been victim); Sean B. Hoar,
Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2001)
(referring to identity theft as crime of new millennium).
3. See Frederick Scholl, The Changing Privacy and Security Landscape, 33 Bus.
COMM. REV. 54, 54 (2003) ("Previously unheard-of issues relating to digital identity
theft, [and] alleged misuse of financial and health-related information . . . have
become everyday front-page news.").
4. See S. REP. No. 105-274, at 8 (1998) (noting that MasterCard reported that
ninety-six percent of its member banks' fraud losses were attributable to identity
theft) (citing GAO report); 147 CONG. REc. S12162 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2001) (state-
ment of Ms. Cantwell) (stating that it takes twelve months on average before iden-
tity theft victim learns of crime); Kenneth M. Dreifach, Federal and State Enforcement
of Consumer Privacy Laws: Focus on Spam, COPPA and Identity Theft, 748 PRAc. L. INST.
1113, 1119 (2003) (reporting that annual cost estimates of identity theft range up
to twenty-seven billion dollars); Hoar, supra note 2, at 1425 (noting that Secret
Service estimated that identity theft cost financial institutions $745 million in 1997
and that MasterCard reported identity fraud cost its member banks $407 million).
(625)
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addition, damages from ideniity theft are difficult to quantify because vic-
tims have a ruined credit report, emotional damage and they must often
spend hundreds of hours to clear their names.5 There are thousands of
reported and unreported cases of identity theft, many of which have devas-
tated the lives of the victims. 6 Many identity thieves escape prosecution
and, consequently, continue to steal the identities of others. 7 Even if law
enforcement arrests an identity thief, the victims have little recourse in
recovering their lost time and money.8
5. See Rogan v. City of Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384, 1387-89 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (relating story of Terry Rogan, whose identity was stolen by killer wanted for
double murder, and his plight of being arrested several times at gunpoint because
of misconception that he was killer). This exemplifies the emotional damage that
may occur when one's identity is stolen and subsequently used to commit crimes.
See 147 CONG. REc. S12162 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2001) (statement by Ms. Cantwell)
(stating that average victim spends 175 hours to clear name); FTC, Identity Theft
Complaint Data, Figures and Trends on Identity Theft January 2000 Through De-
cember 2000, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/idtheft/trends-update-2000.
pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2004) (reporting that victims can expect to spend weeks,
months or years to restore their names and that many victims suffer devastating
effects on their lives); Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and
Consumers: Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 584-85
(2002) (noting that successful thieves will set up accounts in victim's name using
victim's Social Security number and mother's maiden name, leaving victim with
debts and eventually ruined credit report).
6. See FTC OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 8. (projecting that there will be 210,000
reported cases of identity theft in year 2003); Robert O'Harrow Jr., Identity Crisis:
Meet Michael Berry: Political Activist, Cancer Survivor, Creditor's Dream. Meet Michael
Berry: Scam Artist, Killer, and the Real Michael Berry's Worst Nightmare, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 2003, at W14 (relating story of Michael Berry, whose identification was
stolen by wanted murderer who opened fifteen credit cards in Berry's name; more-
over, Berry was arrested because police believed him to be murderer). Berry was
finally cleared after thousands of hours of work. See id. (stating that Berry spent
months correcting his nightmare of identity theft); see also The Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act: Hearing on S. 512 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism and
Gov't Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 2 (stating that one in four
Americans has been victimized by identity theft); Stephen F. Miller, Someone Out
There Is Using Your Name: A Basic Primer on Federal Identity Theft Law, 50 FED. L. 11, 12
(2003) (relating story of woman who went on vacation only to come home and
realize that identity thief had robbed her of $200,000 worth of her personal prop-
erty by impersonating her, and that statistics indicate that there are thousands of
unreported cases of identity theft).
7. See S. REP. No. 105-274, at 7 (reporting that there were 9,500 arrests in 1997
for identity theft). But see FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (finding that 4.6 percent
of American adults have been victims of identity theft and extrapolating this data
to estimate that 9.91 million Americans have been victims of identity theft in past
year).
8. See S. REP. No. 105-274, at 11-12 (noting that Act does instruct judges to
provide restitution, yet not mentioning time lost and fact that identity thieves may
bejudgment-proof). Bills have been proposed to address the restitution issue, but
not one has been enacted yet. The Senate bill of the Identity Theft and Assump-
tion Deterrence Act provided for restitution, stating that:
The section makes clear that in determining restitution, any costs and
attorney fees should be included. Specifically enumerated costs include
those incurred for clearing credit history or rating and those costs in con-
nection with civil or administrative proceedings to satisfy any debt, lien,
626 [Vol. 49: p. 625
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This Note will address the effectiveness of congressional acts in deter-
ring identity theft. Part II discusses the nature of identity theft and the
congressional acts designed to abate instances of identity theft.9 Part III
addresses the purpose and effectiveness of the Identity Theft and Assump-
tion Deterrence Act of 1998 ("ID Theft Act" or "Act"). 10 Part IV addresses
the effectiveness of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and their attempts
to protect personal information." Finally, Part V analyzes the current ef-




A. How Identity Theft Occurs
The easiest and most common way for a thief to steal someone's iden-
tity is by acquiring that person's Social Security number and other private
information. 13 Social Security numbers are attractive to identity thieves
because the numbers are abundant and provide access to a victim's private
or other obligations of the victim arising from a defendant's criminal
activity.
Id.; see also Janice A. Alwin, Privacy Planning: Putting the Privacy Statutes to Work for
You, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 353, 363-64 (2002) (noting that federal laws do not pro-
vide restitution for consumer victims of identity theft, only for affected financial
institutions).
9. For a further discussion of the nature of identity theft and the congres-
sional acts designed to abate instances of identity theft, see infra notes 13-28 and
accompanying text.
10. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act ("ID Theft Act"), 18
U.S.C. § 1028 (2003) (providing for punishment of identity thieves). For a further
discussion of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, see infra notes 29-
53 and accompanying text.
11. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (providing for uniformity in data and privacy in
health information); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2003)
(providing for identity safeguards in financial industries). For a further discussion
of HIPAA and GLBA and their attempts to protect personal information, see infra
notes 54-186 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of suggested reforms, see infra notes 187-255 and
accompanying text.
13. See Protecting Social Security Numbers: Hearing on Preserving the Integrity of So-
cial Security Numbers and Preventing Their Misuse by Terrorists and Identity Thieves Before
the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the House Comm. on Ways & Means and the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec. and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(Sept. 19, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31097760 [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Grant D. Ashley, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Div., F.B.I.) (stating
that possession of Social Security number is key to taking over someone's identity);
Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: Do Individ-
ual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 165, 166
(1999) (noting that Social Security numbers are attractive to thieves because they
open up access to bank accounts and other important private information).
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information. 14 Social Security numbers commonly are used as a national
identifier for everything from car rentals to credit card applications. 15
Often a thief needs only a name and a Social Security number to open up
a credit card account or to access an existing account.1 6
A recent study reported that identity theft occurs mainly because in-
formation was either stolen or released from a company that compiles per-
sonal information. 17  Over one thousand companies compile
comprehensive databases of personal information and transfer this infor-
mation every five seconds. 1 8 Two of the largest compilers of personal data
are the health care and the financial industries. 19 Often, thieves look to
these two sources for obtaining personal information. 20 The liberal shar-
14. For a further discussion of how the use of Social Security numbers pro-
vides access to a person's personal information, see Hearing, supra note 13.
15. See 146 CONG. Rc. S4334 (daily ed. June 8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein) (stating that Social Security numbers have become de facto national identifi-
ers used for everything from soldier's number, telephone company accounts and
even fishing licenses); Alexander C. Papandreou, Krebs v. Rutgers: The Potential for
Disclosure of Highly Confidential Personal Information Renders Questionable the Use of So-
cial Security Numbers as Student Identification Numbers, 20 J.C. & U.L. 79, 81 (1993)
(noting that Social Security numbers are needed for wide range of activities, such
as getting telephone service, using library services, voting, obtaining driver's li-
censes and banking).
16. See Saunders & Zucker, supra note 1, at 668 (stating that with name and
Social Security number it would be possible to access one's account and change
address and then issue cards to new address).
17. See Use and Misuse of Social Security Numbers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Soc. Sec. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (July 10, 2003), availa-
ble at 2003 WL 21608250 (statement of Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Deputy Counsel, Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr.) (reporting that over fifty percent of identity theft cases occur
because personal information is taken from companies that compile personal in-
formation); Beth Moskow-Schnoll, Identity Theft, 23 U.S. Ayrv's BULL. 25 (Nov.
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usab49
06.pdf (stating that bank employees often sell personal information for as little as
fifteen dollars per account and noting that low-level employees often have access
to compilations of personal consumer information).
18. See Mike Hatch, HIPAA: Commercial Interests Win Round Two, 86 MINN. L.
REv. 1481, 1491 (2002) (noting that companies like Metromail Corporation collect
over nine hundred pieces of information on individual consumers and that Medi-
cal Marketing Service sells over fifty lists of names and addresses of people with
various medical conditions to marketers); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social
Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy
Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2000) (stating that companies trade and ex-
change personal information in United States every five seconds).
19. See generally H.R. REP. No. 106-74, pt. 4, at 120 (1999) (noting that finan-
cial services industry is large gatherer of personal information); Privacy Protection
Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977), at http://aspe.hhs.
gov/datacncl/1977privacy/c5.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003) (stating that insur-
ance industry is one of largest gatherers of personal information).
20. See Tyler Chin, Computer Hackers Access 7,000 Patient Files (Mar. 24, 2003),
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/03/24/biscO324.htm (reporting
that 7,000 patient files had been stolen from University of Indiana School of
Medicine, which contained sensitive information, including Social Security num-
bers); Identity Theft Raises Questions About Security (Nov. 27, 2002), at http://
[Vol. 49: p. 625
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ing policies of companies allow personal information to flow far beyond
primary compilers. 21 Once a person's information is released to one of
these central sources, the dissemination of the personal information is
completely out of the person's control. The extent to which this informa-
tion proliferates into third party networks is not known.2 2 The informa-
tion shared by corporate America is one of the principal sources for
identity theft.
2 3
B. What Has Congress Done About This Epidemic?
Congress has recognized the need to protect people's identities and,
accordingly, has passed three laws to achieve that end. In 1998, Congress
passed the ID Theft Act. 24 The ID Theft Act created strong penalties for
identity thieves. 25 In 1996, Congress passed HIPAA.26 HIPAA went into
effect on April 14, 2003, and created strict standards for personal pri-
vacy.2 7 Lastly, Congress passed the GLBA, which went into effect in 2001,
regulating privacy in the financial industry. 28
III. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE IDENTITY THEFT AND ASSUMPTION
DETERRENCE ACT OF 1998
A. Purpose of the ID Theft Act
Prior to the enactment of the ID Theft Act, the only federal regula-
tions that addressed the issue of identity theft were a patchwork of laws
www.itworld.com/nl/itw-today/11272002/ (reporting theft of sensitive financial
information of 30,000 U.S. customers in New York identity theft ring); see also Red
Cross Blood Donors in PA. Are Victims of Identity Theft, 17 No. 8 WHIT-CoLLAR CRIME
REP. 17 (June 2003) (reporting that after patient records were stolen from Phila-
delphia blood drive, twenty-three patients have been confirmed as identity theft
victims).
21. See Hatch, supra note 18, at 1491 (noting that companies such as Me-
troMail sell personal information to third parties).
22. See Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and
the Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MiAmI L. REv. 163,
200 (2001) (suggesting that without regulating third party sharing, information
could theoretically be recycled and reused forever without consumer's consent).
23. For a further discussion of problems arising from corporate sharing, see
infra note 56 (discussing case where bank shared credit information that was later
used by identity thief).
24. See The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act ("ID Theft Act"),
18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2003) (providing for punishment of identity thieves).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (1) (D) (2000) (punishing those who use another's
identification to gain value of more than $1,000, to up to fifteen years in prison).
26. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (providing for uniformity in data and privacy in
health information).
27. See 66 Fed. Reg. 41316, 41341 (Aug. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 412 & 413) (announcing DHHS's final rule regarding HIPAA and setting com-
pliance date to April 14, 2003).
28. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2003) (providing
for identity safeguards in the financial industries).
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that aimed primarily to protect or improve accuracy of stored informa-
tion. 29 These regulations applied to certain industries, and several federal
agencies were responsible for their enforcement. 30 The scattered and
broad nature of the regulations made prosecution of identity thieves ex-
tremely difficult.3' In response to escalating concerns about identity theft,
several states passed laws specifically criminalizing identity theft. 32
Congress proposed the ID Theft Act in March 1997 in response to the
rapid rise of identity theft and the prevalence of dissimilar laws among the
states.33 The purpose of the Act was to criminalize identity theft and to
enable law enforcement to target identity thieves before they violated
other statutes. 34 The Act carries strong penalties for those convict-
29. See Hoar, supra note 2, at 1429 (stating that existing laws targeted those
who stole identification documents, not those who assumed identities without
physical documentation); Saunders & Zucker, supra note 1, at 670 (noting that
federal consumer protection statutes only offered limited protection for identity
theft and that existing laws were only patchwork, primarily designed to ensure in-
formational accuracy and not to combat identity theft).
30. See Saunders & Zucker, supra note 1, at 670 (noting that several statutes
touch upon certain areas, such as disclosure of consumer credit reports without
consent and that these statutes were enforced by variety of federal agencies).
31. See id. at 669 (noting that while current laws prevent inaccuracy of stored
information, they provide little assistance to identity theft victims); see also Hoar,
supra note 2, at 1429 (stating that ID Theft Act was needed because previous laws
criminalized use of identification documents but not use of identification informa-
tion, and that ID Theft Act specifically targets those who fraudulently use personal
information regardless of whether information is in printed form); Maureen A.
Tighe & Emily Rosemblum, 'What Do You Mean, I Filed Bankruptcy?"--Or How the
Law Allows a Perfect Stranger to Purchase an Automatic Stay in Your Name, 32 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1009, 1016 (1999) (noting that existing laws viewed victim of crime as cred-
itor and not necessarily person whose identity was stolen and stating that existing
laws protect financial institutions more than consumers).
32. See S. REp. No. 105-274, at 6 (1998) (noting that Arizona was first state to
make identity theft felony in 1996).
33. See Sabol, supra note 13, at 168-69 (noting that Congress acted due to
growing size of individual and institutional losses arising from identity theft and
that crime of identity theft was crossing state lines, exacerbating need for Congress
to act as identity theft became more complex); see also Ass'n of Am. Physicians &
Surgeons v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that HIPAA falls within congressional Commerce Clause
authority to regulate interstate commerce).
34. See The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act ("ID Theft Act"),
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (3) (7) (2003) (imposing criminal liability on one who "know-
ingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of an-
other person with the intent to commit, or to aid and abet, any unlawful activity
that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local law"). President Clin-
ton also believed the legislation would enable law enforcement to combat identity
theft:
Tens of thousands of Americans have been victims of identity theft. Im-
posters often run up huge debts, file for bankruptcy, and commit serious
crimes. It can take years for the victims of identity theft to restore their
credit ratings and their reputations. This legislation will enable the
United States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
630 [Vol. 49: p. 625
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ed.3 5 The Act charged the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with imple-
menting the Act's objectives. 36 The bill as introduced in the Senate pro-
vided that those convicted under the statute would be responsible for
paying restitution to their victims for their out-of-pocket losses. 37 The
House, however, did not pass this provision of the bill. 38 The ID Theft Act
became law in 1998. 39
other law enforcement agencies to combat this type of crime, which can
financially devastate its victims.
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112
Stat. 3007, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 703, 703 (documenting statement of Pres-
ident William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 4151).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (1) (D) (2000) (punishing with up to fifteen years
in prison those who use another's identification to gain value of more than
$1,000); United States v. Wells, 101 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
current laws did not adequately account for "extreme personal victimization" of
identity theft victims and deciding to depart upward from sentencing guidelines);
Hoar, supra note 2, at 1431-32 (noting that ID Theft Act has base offense level of
"12" because of seriousness of offense, difficulty in quantifying damages and fact
that victims often do not realize that their identities have been stolen until certain
harms have already occurred); Moskow-Schnoll, supra note 17, at 29 (noting that
court can make upward departure in offense level if victim suffered serious harm
or was erroneously arrested). But see Hoar, supra note 2, at 1433 (discussing case in
which identity thief was sentenced to only twenty-seven months in prison after thief
intentionally stole insurance company policyholders' personal information from
work and withdrew $764,000 from policyholders' accounts).
36. See Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education Service for Victims
of Identity Theft, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 5, 112 Stat. 3007 (2003) (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1028) (stating that within one year of enactment of Act, the FTC is
charged with establishing certain procedures). According to the established pro-
cedures the FTC is to:
(1) log and acknowledge the receipt of complaints by individuals who
certify that they have a reasonable belief that I or more of their means of
identification ... have been assumed, stolen, or otherwise unlawfully ac-
quired in violation of section 1028 of title 18, United States Code, as
amended by this Act; [and] (2) provide informational materials to indi-
viduals described in paragraph (1).
Id.
37. See S. REP. No. 105-274, § 3 (1998) (providing for restitution for victims of
out-of-pocket expenses and losses). The bill states that:
[Restitution] "may include payment for any costs, including attorney fees,
incurred by the victim, including any costs incurred-" (1) in clearing the
credit history or credit rating of the victim; or "(2) in connection with any
civil or administrative proceeding to satisfy any debt, lien, or other obliga-
tion of the victim arising as a result of the actions of the defendant."
Id. It is important to note that the proposed Senate bill was not enacted. See 18
U.S.C. § 1028 (2003) (lacking text proposed in Senate report).
38. Compare S. 512, 105th Cong. (1998) (forcing those convicted under stat-
ute to pay restitution to victims for offense relating to identity fraud including
payment for any costs by victim, including attorney fees), with H.R. 4151, 105th
Cong. (1998) (lacking provision for restitution found in Senate bill).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (a) (1) (A) (2003) (permitting court to order restitu-
tion for fraud, but not including proposed amendments by Senate to include 18
U.S.C. § 1028).
7
McMahon: After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA Privacy Provis
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
B. Why the Act Is Ineffective
The title "Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act" implies a
legislative scheme that will curb the quickly rising tide of identity theft.4 0
Identity theft, however, has grown exponentially since the passage of the
Act.41 The Act provides penalties that may suffice to deter, but enforcing
its provisions has proven to be difficult.42 Therefore, the Act's deterrent
effect has failed to materialize. 43 The FTC reports that it has distributed
1.2 million copies of its prevention pamphlet to educate the public on
identity theft. 44 The FTC's statistics reveal the dramatic rise in identity
theft in the United States, a rise that suggests that the public is aware of
the crime but is unable to adequately protect itself.45 Unfortunately for
victims of identity theft, even if the thief is apprehended, victims are not
compensated for their losses. 46 The Act therefore fails to curtail identity
theft because it does not deter thieves, educate consumers or compensate
victims.
4 7
The ID Theft Act is ineffective because it addresses the wrong side of
the problem of identity theft.48 The Act attempts to deter identity thieves
by providing strong penalties.49 With little chance of being appre-
40. But see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing rapid rise in iden-
tity theft, which occurred after passage of Act).
41. For a discussion of the growth of identity theft, see supra note 2 and ac-
companying text.
42. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that close to ten million Ameri-
cans have been victims of identity theft). But see Kristen S. 'Provenza, Identity Theft:
Prevention & Liability, 3 N.C. BANKING INsT. 319, 319 (1999) (reporting that Secret
Service has made only 9,500 arrests); Otto G. Obermaier & Ronald R. Rossi, Evalu-
ating the Crime Legislation by the 105th Congress, 221 N.Y. L.J. 1, 6 (Jan. 26, 1999)
(noting that "the federal law won't deter people because it is too hard to catch
these types of criminals").
43. See Alwin, supra note 8, at 368 (noting that most cases that have been
brought under the ID Theft Act have been criminals who have been caught "red
handed").
44. See FTC OVERVIEW, supra at 2 (reporting that over 1.2 million copies of
FTC's prevention pamphlet have been distributed since February 2000).
45. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 (noting increasing incidence of iden-
tity theft since FTC began compiling statistics on identity theft).
46. But see Hoar, supra note 2, at 1433 (discussing case where defendant was
ordered to pay over $160,000 in restitution to victims after defendant stole Social
Security numbers of several high-ranking military officers and applied for credit
cards in officers' names). This case is exceptional and not the norm in identity
theft prosecutions.
47. See id. (discussing case where defendant was ordered to pay over $160,000
in restitution for fraud). For a further discussion of victims' lack of restitution, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
48. See Alwin, supra note 8, at 367-68 (noting that victim of identity theft is left
with no remedy because identity thieves are so hard to catch).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (1) (D) (2000) (punishing those who use another's
identification to gain value of more than $1,000 with up to fifteen years in prison).
632 [Vol. 49: p. 625
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hended, 50 and the abundance of personal information in the current in-
formation age, the risk of suffering a penalty is well worth the reward for a
potential thief.5 1 Congress should address the problem at the problem's
source because the threat of imprisonment will not deter the thief.52 The
source of identity theft is the prevalence of unsecured personal informa-
tion.53 To combat identity theft at its source, laws should focus on protect-
ing personal information to stop the flood of identity theft victims.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT PERSONAL INFORMATION IN
Two MAJOR TARGETS FOR IDENTITY THIEVES-THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES AND HEALTH CARE INDUSTRIES
A. The GLBA -Privacy for Financial Institutions
1. Overview of the GLBA
Escalating incidences of identity theft combined with the public's
concern for protecting private personal information led Congress to con-
sider drafting legislation on financial privacy.5 4 While Congress was near-
ing a vote on the GLBA regulations, the privacy provisions took on added
weight.5 5 During this time, Minnesota filed suit against U.S. Bank, alleg-
ing that the bank misrepresented to customers that their information was
confidential. 56  U.S. Bank sold the customers' information to
50. See Obermaier & Rossi, supra note 42, at 6 (noting that "the federal law
won't deter people because it is too hard to catch these types of criminals").
51. See Alwin, supra note 8, at 367-68 (noting difficulty in catching identity
thief); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing rapid rise in cases of
identity theft).
52. See Provenza, supra note 42, at 326 (suggesting law is weak because it does
not focus on methods used by identity thieves to gather information). But see Erin
M Shoudt, Identity Theft: Victims Cry Out for Reform, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 339, 365
(2002) (noting that credit card companies believe that more aggressive prosecu-
tion is solution to identity theft prevention, but noting that they have integral part
in prevention).
53. See S. REP. No. 105-274, at 16 (1998) (documenting fears Senator Leahy
noted when Congress was considering ID Theft Act; Leahy claimed that protection
of personal information is challenge in information age, that criminals commonly
get access to personal information of others and use such information to commit
crimes and that thieves can gather information from large centralized sources of
personal information).
54. See Tracie B. Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Af-
forded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 421, 442 (2002)
(arguing that cases where banks revealed private information to third parties
prompted outcry from privacy advocates and caused Congress to enact GLBA pri-
vacy provisions).
55. See Charles M. Horn, Financial Services Privacy at the Start of the 21st Century:
A Conceptual Perspective, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 89, 93-100 (2001) (discussing in-
creased pressure on Congress to enact privacy legislation).
56. See Eric Poggemiller, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-
Leach-Bliley: Much Ado About Nothing?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 618 (2002) (dis-
cussing case initiated by Minnesota against U.S. Bank, in which U.S. Bank allegedly
sold information to telemarketers in violation of consumer protection laws, and
noting case was settled shortly after it was filed).
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telemarketers, who used the information to make fraudulent charges. 57
The public soon realized that most large banks also routinely sold per-
sonal information, leading to increased pressure on Congress to adopt pri-
vacy protections. 58 In enacting the GLBA, Congress set forth the most
stringent privacy regulations ever enacted for the financial industry. 59
The GLBA reflects "the policy of Congress that each financial institution
has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its
customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those custom-
ers' nonpublic personal information."60 At least one court has upheld the
GLBA on constitutional grounds as a legitimate method for furthering
Congress's intent.61 The GLBA gave financial institutions until July 1,
2001, to comply with its regulations, which included mandatory notice re-
quirements of policy,6 2 as well as opt-out requirements to the sharing of
nonpublic information with third parties.63
The GLBA is sweeping because it applies to "financial institutions."
Interestingly, Congress did not clearly define this term in the Act.64 The
FTC has defined the scope of the Act, and in a recent case, a court held
that the FTC's definition is entitled to deference. 65 Financial institutions
57. See id. at 618 (explaining that telemarketers that bought information from
U.S. Bank used information to commit fraud by debiting customer accounts with-
out customers' authorization); see also Loring, supra note 54, at 442 (stating that
third party telemarketers debited consumers' accounts without consumer knowl-
edge or authorization).
58. See Poggemiller, supra note 56, at 618 (noting that lawsuit drew national
attention to privacy issue when it became apparent that most large banks routinely
sold personal information, causing Congress to amend GLBA to include banking
privacy provisions).
59. See Loring, supra note 54, at 443 (stating that GLBA regulations contain
most extensive privacy regulations in history and that regulations are affirmative
and ongoing obligation).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2003).
61. See Individual Reference Servs. Group v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 43
(D.D.C. 2001) (holding that GLBA regulations prohibiting disclosures without
consent clearly advance congressional intent).
62. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.4(a) (2003) (requiring financial institutions to provide
clear and conspicuous notice to customers initially as well as annually); R. Shane
McLaughlin, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act-Analysis & Sugges-
tions for Reform, 72 Miss. L.J. 1099, 1102 (2003) (stating that GLBA requires finan-
cial institutions to supply customers with privacy policy at outset of relationship
and that annual privacy notices must be sent to consumers, but that annual privacy
notices are not required to be sent to former customers).
63. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.6(a)(b) (2003) (requiring privacy notice to contain
customer's opt-out rights); McLaughlin, supra note 62, at 1104 (explaining that
privacy notice must state consumer's right to opt out of disclosures as well as in-
structions on how to exercise that right).
64. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k) (1) (2003) (defining financial institution as busi-
ness that is "significantly engaged" in financial activity).
65. See Trans Union v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42, 49-51 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that
Trans Union, as credit reporting agency, was subject to provisions of GLBA and
that FTC is authorized to define personally identifiable financial information).
The court also decided to defer to the FTC's definition. See id. at 49.
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under the Act include everything from real estate appraisers to automo-
bile dealerships. 66 Entities covered under the Act must meet specific re-
quirements before they may disclose an individual's personal information
to a nonaffiliated third party.67 Congress intensely debated the types of
requirements for various third parties prior to the passage of the Act.
68
One fundamental disagreement in Congress revolved around
whether the Act should establish an opt-out or an opt-in system. In an opt-
out system, information can be shared unless the consumer opts out of the
sharing.6 9 Under an opt-in system, no sharing can take place until the
66. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k) (2) (2003) (giving examples of financial institu-
tions such as retailer that extends credit, real estate appraiser, automobile dealer-
ship that leases cars, career counselors that place individuals into financial
organizations, business that prints checks for consumers, business that wires
money, check cashing business, accountant, travel agency operating in connection
to financial services, mortgage broker and investment advisor); id. § 313.1 (b) (clas-
sifying "mortgage lenders, 'pay day' lenders, finance companies, mortgage bro-
kers, account servicers, check cashers, wire transferors, travel agencies operated in
connection with financial services, collection agencies, credit counselors and other
financial advisors, tax preparation firms, non-federally insured credit unions, and
investment advisors" as financial institutions).
67. See id. § 313.10 (mandating that before entities may disclose personal in-
formation, entities must send initial notice, annual notice and opt-out notice, and
customer, after reasonable period of time, must fail to opt out); see also Horn, supra
note 55, at 101 (noting that above privacy regulations do not apply to affiliates of
covered entities, third parties that perform certain services for covered entity and
third parties that engage in marketing of products related to covered entity).
68. See 145 CONG. REc. S13894 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Shelby). According to Senator Shelby:
The so-called privacy protection of customers being given an opportunity
to "opt-out" clearly demonstrates the corporate benefits this bill intends.
If this bill will benefit consumers, let the corporations sell themselves by
mandating that consumers must "opt-in" to have information on them-
selves shared or sold. Financial literacy is already faced with a plethora of
challenges let alone teaching consumers how to search for obscure fine
print to protect privacy.
Id. Senator Shelby also noted:
I believe these privacy provisions are a sham. I have said it before. They
are ajoke on the American people, and I will not sit by and be a party to
this. When the American people, and they will, become aware of what
Congress has done, it will be too late.
Id.; see also 145 CONG. REc. S13786 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Gramm) (referring to notice requirement). Senator Gramm noted that:
This is important because this is the ultimate protection of privacy. If I
do not believe a bank protects my privacy, I do not want to bank with
them. I can bank with somebody else. If millions of people feel the way I
do, you will get banks that will set out policies of not sharing information,
and they will attract customers.
Id.
69. See generally J. Stephen Zielezienski, Insurance Privacy After Gramm-Leach-
Bliley-Old Concerns, New Protections, Future Challenges, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 315, 320
(2002) (defining "opt out" so that information is shared unless consumer affirma-
tively indicates otherwise).
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consumer opts in. 70 Opt-in supporters did not want consumers to have to
struggle through long documents of fine print to protect their privacy.
7 1
The supporters of the opt-out standard argued that consumers had plenty
of freedom to choose not to have their personal information shared. 72
The financial industry supported the opt-out standard because it claimed
that information sharing was a necessary business practice and that the
costs associated with an opt-in system would be passed on to consumers.
73
Information sharing allows financial institutions to make strategic deci-
sions, offer low risk, preapproved credit cards and create a database of
personal information, which may be sold for income.
7 4
The second controversy during the passing of the GLBA concerned
whether a financial institution could disseminate personal information to
70. See id. at 326 (defining "opt in" so that information is not shared unless
consumer expressly grants consent to share information).
71. See 145 CONG. REc. H11539 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Davis) (noting benefits that opt-in system brings to consumers by allowing them to
keep privacy without having to read through obscure fine print); Poggemiller,
supra note 56, at 630 (noting that some of opt-out notices were ten pages long
because companies wanted low response rate).
72. See 145 CONG. REc. S13785 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Gramm) (noting beneficial services that are possible from opt-out system, stating
that he does not get Neiman Marcus catalogs because Neiman Marcus already
knows that he does not purchase luxury items and that society benefits because
Neiman Marcus does not print expensive and unnecessary catalogs for those who
would not purchase anything); id. at S13786 (noting that opt-out provision allows
consumer to evaluate privacy policies of institutions, and if consumers are not satis-
fied, they can take business elsewhere, and if millions of people feel same way,
banks will revise privacy policies in ways to attract customers).
73. See Ayca Ergeneman, The Devastating Effect of Opt-In Restrictions, 2, at
http://www.aba.com/Industry+Issues/GRPROpt-in.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2003) (stating that "opt-in to information sharing decreases the speed, lowers the
efficiency, and raises the cost of information"); id. 3 (providing example of when
mortgage company would have to start from scratch to collect and verify informa-
tion of loan applicant). But see Beth Givens, Financial Privacy: The Shortcomings of the
Federal Financial Services Modernization Act, 53-55, at http://www.privacyrights.
org/ar/fin-privacy.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) (arguing that costs of opt-in
and opt-out notices are similar and that costs of requirements need to be balanced
against personal and societal costs of fraud that occur when information is
misused).
74. SeeJolina C. Cuaresma, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
497, 506 (2002) (providing multiple reasons why financial institutions want free-
dom to collect personal information, and suggesting that information is valuable
in its own right); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, GLB: More Protections Needed to Ensure Finan-
cial Privacy, SH060 ALI-ABA 199, 201 (2003) (stating that fair information princi-
ples set forth by Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development imply
that data collectors should only collect minimum amount of data necessary for
transaction, and noting that principles also prohibit sharing information gathered
for one purpose for another purpose without consent). Nevertheless, there may
be benefits for financial institutions that minimize their data collection, such as
simpler privacy policies. See id. at 201 (noting that in addition to the benefits of
simpler privacy policies, institutions may also benefit from collecting less informa-
tion that could be misused).
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its affiliates. 75 Supporters argued that allowing financial institutions to
share information with affiliates provided the consumer with the valuable
resource of one-stop shopping.76 Those who opposed affiliate sharing
were shocked that a large financial company could share nonpublic per-
sonal information with "affiliated telemarketers selling non financial prod-
ucts such as travel services, dental plans, and so forth."77
The House version of the GLBA provided for extensive privacy provi-
sions.78 While congressional disagreement threatened the successful pas-
sage of the GLBA, President Clinton signed it into law with limited privacy
provisions.79 Eventually, the GLBA passed with an opt-out requirement,
with several notable exceptions.80 The GLBA does not require opt-out
notices when information is shared to perform services for the financial
institution.8 1 Financial institutions may also share nonpublic information
75. See Therese G. Franzen & Leslie Howell, Financial Privacy Rules: A Step by
Step Guide to the New Disclosure Requirements Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the
Implementing Regulations, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17, 19 (2001) (defining affili-
ate as company that controls, is controlled by or is under same control as another
company).
76. See Jack Cooksey, Private Matters: Does the Law Go Far Enough to Protect Pri-
vacy?, at http://www.insidebiz.com/hamptonroads/special-report/specia1082800
(last visited Nov. 25, 2003) ("[W]hen you do business with First Union, you expect
to be able to do business with all of First Union.").
77. 145 CONG. REC. S13894 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (quoting statement of
Sen. Shelby) (stating that "large financial conglomerates will have more informa-
tion on citizens than the IRS, but [Congress has] done virtually nothing to protect
the sharing of such nonpublic personal financial information for the American
people").
78. See H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1999) (including restrictions of access to con-
sumer information by affiliates); 145 CONG. REc. S13783, 13789 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1999) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (pointing to lack of privacy protections in Sen-
ate bill).
79. See Kristina A.K Hickerson, Consumer Privacy Protection: A Call for Reform in
an Era of Financial Services Modernization, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 781, 784 (2001) (noting
that House version had much stricter privacy provisions but disagreement in Con-
gress threatened Act, with Clinton administration signing much weaker version
into law while asserting that administration would take steps to create more com-
prehensive consumer protection); id. at 792 (noting that House reluctantly ap-
proved Senate version of bill because of importance of overall Act); see also 145
CONG. REC. E2306 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1999) (statement of Rep. Costello) (stating
fear that bill's limited privacy protections would cause "the walls protecting our
financial privacy and other personal information [to] slowly [be] eroded").
80. See Hickerson, supra note 79, at 783-84 (discussing GLBA provisions).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (2003) (requiring financial institution to con-
tract with third party to keep information confidential and to notify customers that
it engages in such practices). The statute states:
This subsection shall not prevent a financial institution from providing
nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party to perform
services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including
marketing of the financial institution's own products or services, or finan-
cial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements between
two or more financial institutions ....
Id. (describing exception).
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with their affiliated third parties without sending an opt-out notice to the
consumer.8 2 Although the GLBA covers a broad range of entities and pro-
vides harsh penalties for noncompliance, 83 its protection of private per-
sonal information is minimal.8 4 The flaws in the Act occurred because
congressional debate weakened a vast amount of the privacy provisions.8 5
2. Why Has the GLBA Proven Ineffective in Protecting Personal Information
from Theft?
This great initiative to protect personal information was drafted with
many loopholes, which in practice give consumers little control over their
private personal information. There are five main weaknesses in the Act:
(1) the GLBA does not properly define what personal information is cov-
ered under the Act; (2) receiving notices of privacy policies does little to
enhance privacy; (3) consumers have no control over information dissemi-
nated to affiliates; (4) consumers have only limited control of the dissemi-
nation of information to third parties via an opt-out notice; and (5)
although the GLBA carries tough penalties, victimized consumers have no
cause of action.
8 6
a. The GLBA Only Covers Nonpublic Information
The GLBA only applies to "nonpublic information," meaning infor-
mation that is not readily available to the public.8 7 Information is consid-
ered public if a financial institution has a reasonable basis to believe that
the information is lawfully available to the public.88 Therefore, informa-
82. See id. § 6802(a) (requiring opt-out notice only when sharing information
with nonaffiliated third party); Horn, supra note 55, at 100-01 (noting that privacy
provisions do not apply to affiliates or to third parties who perform services for
covered entity).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 6823(b) (2003) (stating that violations "involving more
than $100,000 in a 12-month period shall be fined twice the amount provided in
subsection (b) (3) or (c) (3) (as the case may be) of section 3571 of Title 18, impris-
oned for not more than 10 years, or both"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (b)-(c) (2003)
(calling for penalties of up to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for
organizations).
84. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 511 (discussing weaknesses of GLBA).
85. See generally Hickerson, supra note 79, at 791-92 (highlighting congres-
sional debates over GLBA).
86. See generally Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 510 (outlining most accepted
flaws with GLBA).
87. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 (2003) (stating that GLBA only applies to sharing of
nonpublic information); id. § 313.3(n) (stating that nonpublic personal informa-
tion means: "(i) Personally identifiable financial information; and (ii) Any list,
description, or other grouping of consumers (and publicly available information
pertaining to them) that is derived using any personally identifiable financial infor-
mation that is not publicly available").
88. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 511 (stating that information is public if it
can be obtained by government records or widely distributed media); see also 16
C.F.R. § 313.3(n) (2003) (giving example of public information as "list of individu-
als' names and addresses that contains only publicly available information, is not
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tion that the public can obtain through widespread media, such as the
Internet, is not protected under the GLBA.8 9 For example, a nonfinancial
institution could share with a financial institution a list of names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers and other readily available information, and then
compile it with existing personal information to create a more detailed
profile. 90 The effect of covering nonpublic information instead of per-
sonal information is that financial institutions can share larger and more
detailed consumer profiles.91 Critics of the GLBA argue that the Act
should protect public information if the consumer desires to protect this
information. 92 As information becomes ubiquitous online, a personal
profile can be built in minutes at little cost, raising privacy concerns that
did not exist in the world of paper financial records.93 The further that
personal information proliferates into third party networks, the greater
the risk of identity theft.94
b. Notices Do Not Enhance Privacy
Receiving initial and annual privacy notices may provide consumers
with insight into the personal-information-sharing practices of companies,
derived, in whole or in part, using personally identifiable financial information
that is not publicly available").
89. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 511 (noting that FTC acknowledged that
information on Internet site is considered public if site is available to general
public).
90. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 197 (noting that public information could
then be compiled using information that financial institutions have and such infor-
mation could be shared with third parties). But see Trans Union v. FTC, 295 F.3d
42, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that nonpublic information includes all informa-
tion disclosed to financial institution for purpose of transaction, including names,
addresses and Social Security numbers).
91. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 197 (explaining how financial institutions
share information with third parties).
92. See Financial Privacy: Hearing on Emerging Financial Privacy Issues Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, 106th Cong. 16
(1999), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/72099cul.htm
(last visited Nov. 25, 2003) (prepared statement of Dr. Mary Culnan) (noting that
people try to prevent disclosure of public information). Dr. Culnan noted:
The telephone book, one of the most widely available sources of public
information, is a good example that people value the ability to make
choices about disclosing even their name and address, and when offered
choices... [c]onsumers should be able to opt out of having their names
and addresses shared for marketing purposes ....
93. Id.
See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Com-
mon Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 638 (2002) (stating that proliferation of online
information allows profile of individual to be built at minimal cost, raising con-
cerns about risk to privacy that did not exist when society was based on paper
record-keeping system).
94. See Hoofnagle, supra note 74, at 206 (noting that every time information is
shared, opportunity for identity theft increases).
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but large loopholes render the notices completely ineffective.9 5 The pur-
pose of the notice requirement was to allow consumers to take control
over what a bank did with their information, and if they did not like the
bank's policy, they could take their business elsewhere. 96 The largest
loophole in the notice requirement is that it does not apply to former
customers. 97 Therefore, if customers are dissatisfied and take their busi-
ness elsewhere, the institution could share all the personal information
that it had previously compiled. 98 In effect, consumers retain no control
over what happens to their personal information.
Further, the notices themselves do not adequately inform consumers
about what is shared and who the recipients are.99 According to the chair-
man of the FTC, "[a]cres of trees died to produce a blizzard of barely
comprehensible privacy notices." 10 0 Institutions have sent out approxi-
mately 2.5 billion privacy notices as ofJune 2001, costing between two and
five billion dollars in printing costs alone. 10 1 The average home receives
between twenty and fifty annual notices, lessening the chances that people
read the notices. 10
2
c. Financial Institutions Can Share Anything with Affiliates
Under the GLBA, financial institutions are free to disclose any con-
sumer personal information to their affiliates, giving consumers no con-
95. See generally Franzen & Howell, supra note 75, at 20 (outlining general
privacy notice guidelines).
96. See 145 CoNG. REc. S13883 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Edwards) (stating that this is most powerful tool that consumers have over their
privacy); see also Franzen & Howell, supra note 75, at 20 (noting that initial notices
are not even required for consumers who do not have continuing relationship with
institution).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2003) (stating that disclosures are made when
consumer relationship is established); Horn, supra note 55, at 110 (noting that
GLBA annual notice requirement does not apply to former customers).
.98. See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2003) (providing that regulations only apply
when consumer relationship is established); Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 512 (not-
ing that by taking business elsewhere, there is not limitation on sharing of informa-
tion that has already been gathered); Horn, supra note 55, at 105 (defining
consumers versus customers).
99. See Hoofnagle, supra note 74, at 203 (stating that notices do not contain
enough specificity to adequately inform consumers and that companies often tried
to hide privacy issue by reassuring customers that information would only be
shared with trusted and family companies); see also supra note 71 and accompany-
ing text (noting difficulty in reading privacy notices).
100. Robert W. Hahn, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54
ADMIN. L. REv. 85, 130 (2002) (quoting chairman's statement concerning Act).
101. See id. at 130-31 (noting that forty thousand financial institutions mailed
2.5 billion notices to consumers by June 2001); id. at 145 (noting that printing
costs alone from GLBA are between two and five billion dollars).
102. See id. at 130-31 (noting that consumers received 2.5 billion notices by
June 2001, with each home receiving twenty to fifty). Fleet's chief privacy officer
believes that these notices are going unread because consumers are being inun-
dated with such notices. See id. at 131.
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trol over their information. 10 3 The GLBA does not require institutions to
notify consumers about this type of sharing. 10 4 For example, once a bank
obtains personal information, it may share this information with its insur-
ance, brokerage or credit affiliates. 10 5 With the advent of large mergers of
multifaceted corporations, there is essentially no limit on who may be an
affiliate. 106 Therefore, information can be disseminated far beyond what
consumers imagine. 10 7 For example, Charter Pacific Bank was caught sell-
ing 3.6 million credit card files to a convicted felon.' 0 8 Charter Pacific
had compiled the numbers from transactions that occurred at other affili-
ate banks, without notice to consumers. 109
d. An Opt-Out Provision for Third Parties Is Ineffective
Very few consumers choose to opt out of sharing their personal infor-
mation with third parties. 110 The low response rate is largely due to the
difficulty of the process of opting out."1 Because financial institutions
have no incentive to facilitate the process of protecting information, the
opt-out process is usually quite cumbersome. 1 2 A typical opt-out notice is
103. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 512 (explaining that "customers cannot
opt-out of information sharing between affiliates").
104. See id. (noting that affiliate sharing is not subject to GLBA privacy notice
requirements).
105. See id. (noting range of possible companies where one's information
could be shared). For example, one entity may have affiliates in the insurance,
banking and securities industries, and there is no roadblock for exchanging infor-
mation once it is acquired. See id.
106. See id. (noting wide range of affiliate possibilities).
107. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 199 (noting that consumers may misinter-
pret GLBA privacy provisions, not realizing that they do not apply to numerous
affiliates of financial institution).
108. See Fair Credit Reporting Act and Affiliate Sharing Practices: Testimony Before
the S. Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs Comm., 108th Cong. (June 26, 2003), availa-
ble at 2003 WL 21481585 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program
Dir., U.S. Pub. Int. Group) (noting that Charter Pacific had sold database of credit
card numbers to convicted felon who later made fraudulent charges to those
credit cards).
109. See id. (stating that Charter Pacific did not create database of credit card
numbers from its own customers but compiled it with information from affiliate
merchants of Charter Pacific).
110. See Poggemiller, supra note 56, at 627-30 (noting low opt-out response
rate, and discussing why consumers failed to opt out).
111. See infta note 112 and accompanying. text (discussing how companies
make it difficult for consumers to opt out).
112. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 513 (illustrating process that companies
make consumers go through to opt out). For example, companies might make
customers request a form, wait for it to arrive via mail and then send it back via
mail. See id. (describing opt-out process); see also Hoofnagle, sup-a note 74, at 204
(reporting that evidence suggests that institutions are actively frustrating the opt-
out process). For example, many credit card companies make the consumer send
an opt-out form to a different address than where the payment is sent. See id.
(noting how companies frustrate opt-out process). A current petition calls for eas-
ier opt-out procedures such as availability of toll-free numbers, web sites and check
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long, written in fine print and dense legalese. 113 Although the opt-out
notices are supposed to be clear,1 14 most are written on a college or grad-
uate level and contain complicated sentences and uncommon words.'
15
The opt-out notices attempt to persuade the consumer into thinking that
sharing information will bring benefits. 116 For example, the notices in-
clude phrases such as "[i]n order to provide you with better products and
services." 1 7 In Ting v. AT&T,1 18 a California federal court found that
AT&T conducted research to determine how to draft notices that the con-
sumer would likely ignore.11 9
Further, a financial institution can disclose information to a third
party if it performs services for the financial institution. 120 The financial
institution's only obligation is to contract with the third party to keep the
boxes on postcards to facilitate the process. See id. at 203 (describing petition to
reform opt-out procedures).
113. See Poggemiller, supra note 56, at 630 (noting that some opt-out notices
were ten pages long because companies wanted low response rate); see also 145
CONG. REC. HI1539 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. Davis) (stating that
consumers had to sift through privacy notices that were difficult to read).
114. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.5(a) (1) (2003) (stating that annual privacy notices
under GLBA must be clear and conspicuous notice of privacy policies).
115. See Poggemiller, supra note 56, at 629 (noting use of complicated lan-
guage in opt-out notices written by financial institutions, resulting in some receiv-
ing a grade of D or F in report by USAction); Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine
Print: Readability of Financial Privacy Notices (July 2001), at www.privacyrights.org/
ar/GLB-Reading.htm (reporting that study of sixty privacy notices revealed that
they were written on third or fourth year college level and twelve were written on
graduate level; all were rated "difficult" and eighteen were rated "very difficult").
It is recommended that privacy notices be written at ajunior high school level. See
id. (explaining that literacy experts recommend that this is appropriate reading
level for consumers).
116. For a discussion of the persuasive nature of privacy notices that attempt
to get consumers to share their personal information, see infra note 117 and ac-
companying text.
117. Tena Friery & Beth Givens, Financial Privacy Notices: Do They Really Want
You to Know What They're Saying? (June 2001), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
GLB-CodeOpEd.htm (arguing that companies use such language in opt-out no-
tices as marketing ploy to get customers to consent to sharing information); see also
Hoofnagle, supra note 74, at 204 (noting that financial institutions try to persuade
customers not to opt out by stating that information will only be shared with
"trusted" or "family" corporations).
118. 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
119. See id. at 913 (finding that AT&T discovered that by indicating in bold-
face type that what is contained in notice does not affect billing, most customers
would stop reading). The AT&T notice in boldface at the top of the document
read, "Please be assured that your AT&T service or billing will not change under
the AT&T Consumer Services Agreement; there's nothing you need to do." Id.
120. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.11 (a) (iii) (2003) (allowing third parties who perform
service to disclose information in ordinary course of business of providing service);
Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (noting that disclosures may be made to third par-
ties who provide services as long as notice of this type of disclosure is included in
financial institution's initial privacy notice). But see Horn, supra note 55, at 113
(suggesting that notice requirement may be met by stating that information will be
shared to extent allowed by law).
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information private.12 1 Therefore, an institution could share with anyone
as long as it and the third party had a contractual agreement, thereby
bypassing the entire opt-out provision. 122 Third parties could then trans-
fer the information and a consumer's private information would circulate
ad infinitum, effectively removing all control of personal information from
the consumer. 123 In addition, a recent district court decision held that a
customer must opt in before institutions can share their information for a
subpoena. 124 Arguably, this precedent enables a financial institution to
share a consumer's information with an affiliate or contracted third party
easier than it can share the information with a court of law.
e. No Private Cause of Action for Violations
The GLBA does not give citizens a private cause of action if institu-
tions share their information in a manner that violates the GLBA.1 2 5 Only
the FTC has the right to enforce the GLBA privacy provisions. 126 Cur-
rently, the GLBA regulates abusive privacy practices instead of addressing
individual financial institution infractions.1 27 For example, in Menton v.
Experian Corp.,12 8 the court held that the victim had no cause of action
121. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.13(a) (1) (ii) (2003) (requiring contractual agreement
to keep information private and prohibiting disclosure of information for pur-
poses other than to carry out purposes for which information was disclosed);
Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (noting that contractual agreement requires third
party to maintain confidentiality of information provided to it by covered entity).
122. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (noting that "a financial institution
may entirely circumvent [the GLBA] by entering into contracts with third party
service providers"); see also Horn, supra note 55, at 113 (suggesting that financial
institutions may be able to contract with third parties without adequately inform-
ing consumer by simply stating that consumer information will be shared to extent
allowed by law).
123. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (arguing that, unknown to consumer,
third party services and marketing exceptions could theoretically allow third par-
ties to reuse information and retransfer personal information to more nonaf-
filiated third parties, thus bypassing all GLBA privacy protections).
124. See Union Planters Bank v. Gavel, No. CIV.A.02-1224, 2002 WL 975675,
at *6 (E.D. La. May 9, 2002) (holding that, based on GLBA, bank was preliminarily
enjoined from releasing customer's information without consent).
125. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 514 (noting that GLBA does not provide
victims with private cause of action).
126. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.1(b) (2003) (stating that FTC has enforcement au-
thority over financial institutions); Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 514 (noting that
enforcement consists of correcting abusive practices instead of reconciling individ-
ual rights harmed by infractions and that federal and state agencies, including
FTC, are responsible for addressing infractions by institutions).
127. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 514 (noting that under current enforce-
ment, financial institutions have little incentive to comply because consumers
whose information is disclosed in violation of GLBA lack private right of action);
Loring, supra note 54, at 448 (noting that GLBA does not provide consumer with
cause of action against financial institution for wrongful disclosure).
128. No. 02 CWV.4687 (NRB), 2003 WL 21692820 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003).
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when Experian sold a customer's Social Security number and other identi-
fiable information. 129
Although the GLBA initially aimed to protect privacy, the watered-
down version really does little to enhance protection of sensitive informa-
tion. Financial institutions have sent out billions of notices without any
change in privacy materializing. 130 Further, the defective nature of the
GLBA, being "riddled with loopholes and exceptions," makes the con-
sumer's ability to opt out ineffective. 13 1
B. HIPAA-Privacy for the Health Care Industry
Ironically, even though Congress passed HIPAA before the GLBA,
HIPAA carries much tougher privacy standards for the health industry.' 3 2
HIPAA was enacted to facilitate health insurance transferability and the
transfer of private information between entities.' 33 Medical records con-
tain some of the most sensitive personal information; however, more than
seventeen organizations may handle a single medical record, 34 and ap-
proximately four hundred people may see a patient's medical record dur-
ing one hospital stay.' 3 5 According to some in the industry, "patient
confidentiality is not eroding-it can't erode, because it's simply nonexis-
tent.' 3 6 A 1999 poll indicated that ninety percent of Americans feel that
insurance companies' sharing records with other companies without con-
129. See id. at *3 (holding that Menton did not have cause of action because
GLBA will be enforced by federal and state authorities and FTC only).
130. See Robin K. Warren, GLB Privacy: More Than Just Consumer Notices, SG066
ALI-ABA 61, 63 (2002) (stating that billions of notices have been sent by financial
institutions); see also Hahn, supra note 100, at 130-31 (stating that over 2.5 billion
privacy notices have been sent as ofJune 2001). For a discussion of the increase in
identity theft caused by lack of privacy, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
131. Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 234 (referring to flaws in GLBA as enacted).
132. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2003) (stating that regulations apply to "past,
present, and future" health care transactions of individuals); id. § 164.502(a)
(2003) (stating that information can only be disclosed to individual and otherwise
authorization of individual is required); see also McLaughlin, supra note 62, at 1102
(noting that GLBA does not apply to former customers).
133. See Robert W. Woody, Health Information Privacy: The Rules Get Tougher, 37
TORTS & INS. L.J. 1051, 1051-52 (2002) (noting that idea of health information
traveling between entities gave rise to privacy concerns).
134. See Medical Records Privacy: Hearing on the Proposed Rule on the Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor
& Pensions, 107th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2000), available at 2000 WL 504626 (opening
statement of Sen.Jeffords, Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pen-
sions) (stating that typical record can be seen by several individuals in more than
seventeen different companies or organizations).
135. See Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduction
to the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 483
(2000) (noting that Congressional Research Service reported that approximately
four hundred people see some portion of patient's medical record as result of one
hospital stay).
136. Maggie Scarf, Keeping Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1996, § 6, at 38 (state-
ment of Mark Hudson, former health insurance company employee).
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sent is an invasion of privacy. 137 Accordingly, about one in six Americans
takes affirmative steps to protect his or her privacy, such as paying out-of-
pocket, rather than submitting personal information. 138 While Congress
sought to protect the transfer of personal information, it did not directly
create the privacy regulations-the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) created them.' 39
1. Overview of Regulations
a. HIPAA's Application
The HIPAA privacy provisions went into effect on April 14, 2003.140
The HIPAA privacy provisions apply to all individually identifiable health
information.14t Interestingly, unlike the GLBA, the HIPAA privacy regula-
tions apply to information from past transactions and customers. 14 2 Fur-
ther, the HIPAA privacy provisions apply to a much broader range of
entities than the GLBA; nevertheless, the GLBA does not supersede or
limit any HIPAA regulations. 143 The HIPAA privacy provisions apply to
health plans, health care clearinghouses and health care providers.
144
137. See Scott, supra note 135, at 491 (reporting that 1999 poll indicated that
ninety percent of Americans believe that sharing is invasion of privacy, and 1996
poll indicated that eighty-seven percent of Americans believe companies should
get permission before sharing).
138. See id. at 493 (stating that one in six patients engages in privacy-protect-
ing behaviors, such as switching doctors, paying out-of-pocket and other steps to
ensure that his or her information is kept secret).
139. See Woody, supra note 133, at 1052 (noting that Congress instructed
DHHS to create rules if Congress did not create them itself within thirty-six
months). When Congress failed to act, DHHS set forth the current rules. See id.
(discussing process for promulgating DHHS regulations).
140. See 66 Fed. Reg. 41316, 41341 (Aug. 7, 2001) (announcing DHHS's final
rule regarding HIPAA, and setting compliance date to April 14, 2003) (to be codi-
fied 42 C.F.R. pts. 412 & 413).
141. See 45 C.F.R § 164.501 (2003) (defining individually identifiable informa-
tion as including "(A) Name and address; (B) Date of birth; (C) Social Security
number; (D) Payment history; (E) Account number"); see also 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(n)
(2003) (stating vague standard of GLBA that protects nonpublic personal informa-
tion, which is later defined as personally identifiable information).
142. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2003) (stating that regulations apply to "past,
present, and future" health care transactions of individuals); see also 16 C.F.R.
§ 313.4(a) (2003) (stating that GLBA privacy applies to customers); McLaughlin,
supra note 62, at 1102 (noting that GLBA does not apply to former customers).
143. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.1(b) (2003) ("Nothing in this part modifies, limits, or
supersedes the standards governing individually identifiable health information
promulgated by the Secretary of DHHS under the authority of sections 262 and
264 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 .... ").
144. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.104 (2003) ("Except as otherwise provided, the stan-
dards, requirements, and implementation specifications adopted under this part
apply to the following entities: (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse.
(3) A health care provider. .. ."); id. § 160.103 ("Health plan means an individual
or group plan that provides, or pays the cost of, medical care."). These entities can
range from insurance companies to private health plans offered by employers,
which broadens the applicability of the Act to the private business sector. See id.
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The HIPAA regulations therefore also cover many of the entities covered
by the GLBA, and those entities must comply with both statutes. 145
Entities covered under the GLBA are also covered under HIPAA both
directly and indirectly as third parties. 146 For example, if a bank per-
formed a financial outsourcing service for a covered entity, it would be
directly subject to the HIPAA privacy regulations.1 47 Much like the GLBA,
third parties that perform functions for a covered entity1 48 are regulated
by contractual agreements with the covered entity.' 49 These agreements
prevent the third party from disclosing personal information in violation
(including "[a]n employee welfare benefit plan or any other arrangement that is
established or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing health benefits
to the employees of two or more employers" under HIPAA regulations); William P.
Matthews, Caught Up in the Expanding Net: Regulation of the Business Associate Under
the HIPAA Privacy Regulations, 72J. KAN. B.A. 32 (Apr. 2003) (noting that indepen-
dent contractors, vendors and others not in health care industry, but who will or
may obtain personal information are covered under HIPAA as "business
associates").
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (stating that GLBA does not
supercede or limit HIPAA). Therefore, HIPAA is the federal floor, and financial
institutions would have to comply with any GLBA regulation that offers greater
privacy. See Scott, supra note 135, at 515 (noting that HIPAA provides floor pre-
emption, referencing fact that HIPAA does not displace stronger state privacy
laws).
146. See Robert C. Lower & Michelle A. Williams, Analysis of the Final HIPAA
Privacy Regulations and Potential Implications for Financial Institutions, 5 ELECTRONIC
BANKING L. & COM. REP. 11 (Feb. 2001) (noting that financial institutions can be-
come subject to HIPAA both directly and indirectly, depending on type of service
provided). If financial institutions provide self-insured health plans for their em-
ployers, they are directly subject to HIPAA. See id. If, however, they perform cer-
tain data services for covered entities, they are indirectly subject to HIPAA as
business associates. See id.
147. See id. at 11 (noting broad-reaching effects of HIPAA regulations); see also
id. (stating that HIPAA will apply to financial institutions that "(1) provide health
insurance services; (2) provide certain financial services to members of the health
care industry; and (3) provide health insurance benefits for their employees").
148. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (stating that business associate is person who pro-
vides "legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management"
where this service involves personal information).
149. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(ii) (2003) (defining duty). The regulation
states:
A covered entity is not in compliance with the standards in § 164.502(e)
and paragraph (e) of this section, if the covered entity knew of a pattern
of activity or practice of the business associate that constituted a material
breach or violation of the business associate's obligation under the con-
tract or other arrangement, unless the covered entity took reasonable
steps to cure the breach or end the violation, as applicable, and, if such
steps were unsuccessful: (A) Terminated the contract or arrangement, if
feasible; or (B) If termination is not feasible, reported the problem to the
Secretary.
Id. (discussing when covered entity is noncompliant); see also Matthews, supra note
144, at 37 (recognizing that without addressing business associate, covered entities
would be able to contract around HIPAA privacy provisions).
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of the privacy provisions. 150 If a consumer paid for health treatment or
insurance with a credit card, however, the financial institution would not
be brought under the HIPAA regulations as a third party business associ-
ate. 15 1 Nevertheless, virtually all financial institutions provide health ben-
efit plans for their employees and, therefore, become directly subject to
the HIPAA privacy rules.
152
Under HIPAA, if a third party breaches the contractual arrangement,
the covered entity must take steps to correct the breach or terminate the
contract.153 Third parties themselves are not governed by the regulations,
only by their contractual commitments. 154 The protections of the privacy
rule pass through to the contracted business associates of the covered en-
tity. 15 5 The covered entity is liable for unauthorized disclosures by a third
party if the covered entity had actual knowledge of material violations. 156
This liability only requires that the entity terminate the contract.157 At the
150. See Matthews, supra note 144, at 40 (explaining how requirement ex-
pands business associate's obligations beyond actual agreement and incorporates
by reference all privacy provisions).
151. See Lower & Williams, supra note 146, at 5 (noting HIPAA privacy regula-
tions do not classify financial institution as business associate when financial insti-
tution processes credit card payment); DianaJ.P. McKenzie & Benjamin D. Kern,
Privacy and Outsourcing: The Regulatory Framework, 724 PRAc. L. INST. 341, 355
(2002) (stating that financial institutions are not business associates because they
act as conduit for protected information by transmitting information, but financial
institutions are not intended to access information).
152. See Anne Wallace, The Impact of HIPAA on Financial Institutions, 56 CON-
SUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 231, 232 (2002) (stating that virtually all financial institutions
provide group medical, dental, vision and health spending accounts, which are
health plans under HIPAA privacy provisions).
153. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504 (stating that covered entity can be responsible if
entity had actual knowledge of business associate misconduct).
154. See Woody, supra note 133, at 1069 (noting that third party obligations
arise only on contractual responsibilities and suggesting that this will lead to litiga-
tion concerning who is responsible for unauthorized third party disclosures).
155. See Diane Kutzko et al., HIPAA in Real Time: Practical Implications of the
Federal Privacy Rule, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 419 (2003) (claiming that privacy rule
clearly passes through to business associates and that business associates are under
same duties as covered entities when dealing with personal information); Mat-
thews, supra note 144, at 40 (stating that HIPAA contractual provisions incorporate
by reference privacy standards to third party business associate).
156. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
67 Fed. Reg. 53,252 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164)
(stating that "the Rule only requires that, where a covered entity knows of a pat-
tern of activity or practice that constitutes a material breach or violation of the
business associate's obligations under the contract, the covered entity take steps to
cure the breach or end the violation"); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (1) (ii) (2003)
(holding covered entity responsible when it knew of material breach, unless it took
reasonable steps to cure breach or violation); Matthews, supra note 144, at 41 (stat-
ing that covered entity has actual knowledge when it has substantial evidence of
violations).
157. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(ii) (stating that if breach cannot be recon-
ciled, covered entity must terminate relationship, and if infeasible to terminate,
report third party to DHHS); Matthews, supra note 144, at 40-41 (recognizing that
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conclusion of the contractual relationship, the third party must destroy
any personal information received from its association with the covered
entity.158
b. Authorization Requirements Before Disclosure-The Opt-In
Provision
Like the GLBA, HIPAA requires covered entities to send a privacy
notice that states the entities' policies for sharing personal information
without consent. 15 9 A covered entity may disclose personal information
only with the consent or authorization of the patient.1 60 This opt-in provi-
sion prohibits any disclosure without prior explicit authorization unless an
exception applies.1 61 A patient must clearly write and sign an authoriza-
tion.162 No authorization is required for disclosures made for certain mar-
keting purposes. 163 An opt-out option, however, is still provided, and only
the "minimum necessary" information to accomplish the purpose of the
transaction may be disclosed. 164
termination of business-associate agreement is extent of remedy available after cov-
ered entity has taken reasonable steps to attempt to end breach of privacy
contract).
158. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2) (ii) (I) (stating that at conclusion of rela-
tionship, business associate must destroy personal information, and if it is not feasi-
ble to destroy, business associate must continue to protect information); Wallace,
supra note 152, at 234 (noting that HIPAA requires that records be destroyed or
returned to covered entity at completion of contractual relationship; if personal
information cannot be destroyed or returned then it must continue to be pro-
tected under provisions of contract).
159. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b) (2003) (stating notice requirements and that
HIPAA notice must include following statement prominently displayed: "THIS
NOTICE DESCRIBES HOW MEDICAL INFORMATION ABOUT YOU MAY BE
USED AND DISCLOSED AND HOW YOU CAN GET ACCESS TO THIS INFOR-
MATION. PLEASE REVIEW IT CAREFULLY").
160. See id. § 164.502(a) (2003) (stating that information can only be dis-
closed to individual and that, for other disclosures, authorization of individual is
required); id. § 164.508(c) (1) (2003) (stating that authorization must be specific
and identify information that is to be disclosed, to whom it will be disclosed and
for what purpose it will be disclosed).
161. See id. § 164.512 (2003) (noting list of HIPAA exceptions, including mar-
keting, public safety and treatment purposes); id. § 164.514(e) (2003) (stating that
only opt-out requirement is required for marketing purposes).
162. See id. § 164.508(c) (3) (providing that "[t]he authorization must be writ-
ten in plain language").
163. See id. § 164.508(a) (3) (stating that no authorization is needed to dis-
close personal information for marketing services if marketing is face-to-face or if
marketing is for promotional gift of nominal value that is provided by covered
entity); see also Woody, supra note 133, at 1065 (stating that covered entity must
determine that product is beneficial to person being targeted, and covered entity
must inform individual why individual was targeted).
164. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (1) (stating that "a covered entity must make
reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum necessary
to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request"); Matthews,
supra note 144, at 40 (noting that minimum necessary standard also applies to
disclosures that are authorized).
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c. Criticisms of HIPAA Privacy Protections
Privacy advocates are concerned that the exceptions to the privacy regu-
lations will undermine HIPAA's overall scheme, and some advocates feel
that HIPAA offers little privacy protection. 165 Under HIPAA, an entity can
disclose personal information for its own health care operations, including
patient care and billing services. 166 The "good faith" notice requirement
permits entities to design business-friendly notices, which may fail to in-
form the patient. 167 Critics of HIPAA also argue that many patients will
likely sign authorization forms without reading them. 168 Another concern
is that DHHS did not define the "minimum necessary" standard for infor-
mation that is disclosed. 169 Confusion also arises about the extent of the
"reasonable efforts" required to reduce personal information to the "mini-
mum necessary" standard.170 Therefore, HIPAA allows the covered entity
to judge how much personal information it should disclose.
On its face, HIPAA sets relatively strong privacy provisions, yet it does
not have an adequate enforcement mechanism.' 7' The HIPAA regula-
165. See 142 CONG. Rc. H9785, 9792 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of
Mr. McDermott) (stating that there is "not one single shred of protection of your
privacy" under HIPAA privacy provisions); Mary K. Martin, Some Things Old, Some
Things New: The HIPAA Health Information Privacy Regulations, 59 BENCH & B. MINN.
32 (2002) (noting that existing laws in some states provide greater protections
than HIPAA).
166. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2003) (stating that "a covered entity may use or
disclose protected health information for treatment, payment, or health care
operations").
167. SeeJennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out-The Burdens and Challenges of
HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the "Minimum Necessary" Standard,
and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 172-73 (2003) (arguing
that relaxed procedures could potentially fail to provide patients with privacy in-
formation, and noting that simple signature in log book could be sufficient to
meet "good faith effort" acknowledgment requirement of privacy rule).
168. See Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late to Protect
Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1497, 1504 (2002) (stating that it is well known that
patients sign forms without understanding them). Many hospitalizations and med-
ical procedures carry with them an inherent level of stress, which may impair the
patient's comprehension of the notice. See Kutzko, supra note 155, at 410 (noting
that one-time notice, provided during high stress time of admission, may not be
sufficient for patient to form basis of knowing waiver).
169. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (1) ("When using or disclosing protected
health information or when requesting protected health information from an-
other covered entity, a covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit pro-
tected health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended
purpose of the use, disclosure, or request."); Jacobson, supra note 168, at 1505
(noting ambiguity and difficulty in determining what "reasonable efforts" and
"minimum necessary" mean in practice).
170. See Guthrie, supra note 167, at 166 (arguing that DHHS created "more
confusion than assistance" by requiring that covered entities use input of prudent
professionals in order to achieve compliance with privacy provisions, and sug-
gesting that DHHS clarify level of reasonableness required so that covered entities
may establish policies and procedures).
171. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2003) (defining stringent guidelines of HIPAA
compliance); see also Winn, supra note 93, at 618 (stating that HIPAA does not
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tions carry strong penalties for unauthorized disclosures, including fines
of up to $250,000 and sentences of up to ten years in prison. 172 Adminis-
trative agencies enforce HIPAA, and individuals have no private cause of
action.1 73 Compounding this problem is the fact that third parties are not
subject to legal sanctions, even though these third parties are businesses
responsible for many of the abuses of personal information.
174
HIPAA privacy provisions also come under attack for their marketing
exceptions. 175 Authorization is not required for goods or services of a
nominal value. 176 HIPAA critics have suggested that a marketer could get
personal information by offering a fifty-cent coupon. 177 Another market-
ing exception is that no authorization is required for health-related prod-
ucts or services of the covered entity.
178
The largest complaint from the health care industry focuses on the
costs of implementing privacy protections. 179 The strict HIPAA privacy
regulations are estimated to cost over $3 billion for compliance in the first
year.' 8 0 Nevertheless, bipartisan support exists for protecting privacy de-
provide federal cause of action to remedy violations, but, rather, patients must rely
on administrative process). Perhaps even more alerting, business associates are
not subject to HIPAA sanctions, yet evidence indicates that they are often responsi-
ble for abuses of personal information. See id. (listing common criticisms of
HIPAA).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2003) (stating that "if the offense is committed
with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for
commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm, [the offender shall] be
fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both").
173. See Winn, supra note 93, at 618 (noting that HIPAA rules do not create
federal cause of action for those injured through violation of rules); see also Loring,
supra note 54, at 448 (noting that GLBA does not provide consumer with cause of
action against financial institution for wrongful disclosure).
174. See Winn, supra note 93, at 618 (noting that business associates are not
subject to legal sanctions of HIPAA rules, and finding this fact troubling because
these business associates appear responsible for many of abuses of personal infor-
mation that led Congress to consider Act in first place).
175. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (3) (2003) (stating marketing exceptions allow
exception from HIPAA requirements for face-to-face marketing technique and
gifts of nominal value).
176. See id. § 164.508(a) (3) (i) (stating that authorization is not required for
marketing when communication is in form of promotional gift of nominal value
that is provided by covered entity or when face-to-face marketing occurs).
177. See James D. Molenaar, The HIPAA Privacy Rule: It Helps Direct Marketers
Who Help Themselves to Your Personal Health Information, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U.
DETROIT C.L. 855, 870 (suggesting that marketers could get personal information
by offering pencils, coupons and various other low cost items).
178. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(f) (1) (2003) (stating that covered entity may use
or disclose protected information for purposes of fundraising); id. § 164.501
(2003) (stating that marketing includes communications relating to health prod-
ucts and services provided by covered entity).
179. See generally Jacobson, supra note 168, at 1503 (noting that from industry
perspective, HIPAA will be very costly and that government cost estimates are
much lower than industry cost estimates).
180. See Scott, supra note 135, at 513 (stating that federal officials estimate
HIPAA compliance to cost $3.2 billion, while those in industry expect compliance
650
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spite costs to the health care industry. 18 1 Moreover, analysts suggest that
the high-cost estimates associated with HIPAA compliance are linked to
the exponential growth of electronic record keeping with little regard for
previous duties of confidentiality.' 82 The relatively stringent HIPAA pri-
vacy standards generated constitutional challenges to DHHS's authority to
promulgate such rules.18 3 Furthermore, parties challenged the HIPAA
regulations for vagueness.18 4 Despite these challenges, HIPAA went into
effect unscathed.18 5 Although HIPAA survived, so do the challenges it




GLBA and HIPAA are statutes that aim to protect consumers' per-
sonal information. Extreme privacy regulations, however, may actually in-
jure consumers by denying them valuable services. 18 7 Both GLBA and
HIPAA strive to protect personal information while allowing consumers to
enjoy the benefits available in the information age. Both laws, however,
contain loopholes that allow entities to disseminate personal information
to third parties. In the arena of identity theft, any dissemination of per-
to cost many times that amount); see also Mary Beth Johnston, HIPAA Becomes Real-
ity: Compliance with New Privacy, Security, and Electronic Transmission Standards, 103 W.
VA. L. REv. 541, 552 n.64 (2001) (noting that 1999 Blue Cross/Blue Shield survey
estimated HIPAA privacy compliance costs at $43 billion).
181. See Winn, supra note 93, at 640-41 (noting that HIPAA regulations have
gone through two political administrations, and indicating bipartisan support for
increased protection of privacy even if it involves significant costs to health care
industry).
182. See id. at 680 (suggesting that high costs associated with HIPAA privacy
appear to be due to "exponential growth in use of electronic health information"
without corresponding growth in "existing duties of confidentiality," implying that
compliance with HIPAA rules is simply wake-up call to health industry that explo-
sion of electronic information also carries potential dangers).
183. See S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 352-55 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that it was not unconstitutional for DHHS to set privacy standards).
184. See id. (finding that regulations are not unconstitutionally vague).
185. See id. at 352-55 (holding that it was not unconstitutional for DHHS to set
privacy standards, that protections can extend to nonelectronic record informa-
tion and that statute and regulations are not unconstitutionally vague); Ass'n of
Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 224 F. Supp.
2d 1115, 1124 n.5, 1126 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that HIPAA did not preempt
state laws that are not contrary to privacy rule if state rule is more stringent and
that HIPAA falls within congressional Commerce Clause authority to regulate in-
terstate commerce).
186. See Molenaar, supra note 177, at 857-58 (noting that HIPAA privacy regu-
lations are largely ineffective because of loopholes).
187. See Scott, supra note 135, at 494-95 (discussing Maine privacy law that was
so stringent that it prevented hospital personnel from giving patient information
to family and friends over phone, blocked delivery of flowers to patients and pre-
vented doctors from comparing patient notes without patient consent). The law
was repealed within two weeks of its enactment and replaced. See id. (explaining
results of "too much" privacy).
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sonal information increases the risk of theft. 18 8 Since the passage of
HIPAA and the GLBA, identity theft has continued to soar to record
levels.1 89 To effectively curb the increase in identity theft, Congress
should use HIPAA as an initial framework, and with several modifications,
HIPAA and the GLBA can work together to prevent the theft or dissemina-
tion of personal information from large financial and health care
institutions. 190
A. Adopt the HIPAA Opt-In Standard
Because of the difficulty of opting out, Congress should modify the
GLBA to include an opt-in system. Although many Americans are con-
cerned about their privacy, less than five percent choose to opt out of
information sharing. 19 1 On the other hand, 52.8 percent of adults choose
not to have their information shared when presented with an opt-in op-
tion. 192 Statistics suggest that the opt-out provisions are not enough and
that the average consumer cannot or does not read and understand
them.' 9 3 Polls indicate that a vast majority of Americans prefer an opt-in
system.' 94 A recent vote in North Dakota corroborated the polls' results
when seventy-two percent of the residents voted for an opt-in system.
19 5
The argument that switching to an opt-in system would be too expensive is
188. See Hoofnagle, supra note 74, at 206 (giving examples that show that
every time information is shared, opportunity for identity theft increases).
189. For a further discussion of the rise in identity theft, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
190. See Hickerson, supra note 79, at 797 (noting that HIPAA provides initial
framework for expanding privacy protections beyond medical records and into fi-
nancial industry); see also Lower & Williams, supra note 146, at 11 (noting that
many financial institutions are already brought under HIPAA both directly and
indirectly).
191. See Hahn, supra note 100, at 150 (stating that according to one study,
only three percent of adults in 2002 chose to opt out of centralized information
sharing).
192. See id. at 149 (noting that 48.2 percent of adults chose to have their infor-
mation shared under opt-in system, leaving personal information of 52.8 percent
of adults unshareable).
193. See id. (noting that under opt-out system 96.3 percent of people did not
respond, thus allowing vast majority of information to be shared, and stating that
under opt-in system, 48.2 percent chose explicitly to have their information
shared). This discrepancy shows that individuals want their information protected,
but are unable to do so under an opt-out system. See id. (explaining consumer
trend).
194. See Hoofnagle, supra note 74, at 205 (reporting that ninety-three percent
of Americans believe that permission should be received before sharing).
195. See id. (citing March 2000 BusinessWeek-Harris poll that indicated eighty-
eight percent of Internet users wanted to opt in before Web sites shared their
information and that 1991 Time-CNN poll indicated that ninety-three percent of
respondents believed companies should get permission before sharing). Another
poll reported that onJune 11, 2002, seventy-two percent of North Dakota residents
voted for an opt-in system despite the banking industry spending over $100,000 to
oppose the vote. See id.
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flawed because the expense can be offset by the tens of billions of dollars a
year that companies would otherwise lose to identity theft.'" 6
Opponents of the opt-in system argue that there is no difference be-
tween opting in and opting out because a consumer still has a choice
under both systems. 197 However, if the consumer does not understand
the notice, setting the nonresponse default to protect personal informa-
tion is the safest and most cautious means of protecting privacy. t98 The
financial services industry and the health care industry argue that opt-in
systems are more burdensome because they must contact each cus-
tomer.199 This argument fails because under both the GLBA and HIPAA,
entities must contact each customer with an opt-out provision.200 Infor-
mation advocates contend that the opt-in system is more intrusive because
it requires companies to contact customers continually to gain their per-
mission to share information. 20 1 If opting in is more intrusive, Congress
could ameliorate the intrusiveness by only allowing institutions to send
opt-in notices with their required annual privacy notices under the
GLBA. 20 2 Nevertheless, the risk of losing personal information outweighs
the expenses of complying with the law.
20 3
1. The Alleged Adverse Impacts of an Opt-In Scheme-The MBNA Case Study
In 2002, Professor Cate of Indiana University School of Law launched
a case study into the effect an opt-in scheme would have on a large finan-
cial institution, namely, MBNA.20 4 MBNA is an extreme case because it
196. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (finding that identity theft costs busi-
nesses, including financial institutions, $47.6 billion annually).
197. See Zielezienski, supra note 69, at 352 (noting that opt-in system provides
consumers with choice, but arguing that this is less of choice because it assumes
that consumers prefer privacy over benefits of goods and services available).
198. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting benefit opt-in system
brings by not requiring consumers to read through long documents).
199. See Zielezienski, supra note 69, at 352 (discussing cost burden of opt-in
system).
200. See id. (arguing that opt-in system is inherently more costly to implement
because it requires contacting each customer directly as opposed to contacting all
customers at once). But see Givens, supra note 73 (arguing that opt-in costs are not
substantial compared to opt-out requirements).
201. See Zielezienski, supra note 69, at 352 (arguing that opt-in scheme is
more intrusive because it requires more contacts before company can get consent
to share information). But see Givens, supra note 73 (stating that cost for opt-in
system is not as high as analysts claim).
202. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.4(a) (2003) (requiring financial institutions to pro-
vide clear and conspicuous notice to customers, and these notices must be sent
initially as well as annually).
203. See Fred H. Cate & Michael E. Staten, The Privacy Leadership Initiative,
The Adverse Impact of Opt-In Privacy Rules on Consumers: A Case Study of Retail Credit
(Apr. 2002), at http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/white
papers/RetailCreditStudy.pdf (discussing case study to demonstrate costs and ben-
efits of complying with GLBA).
204. See id. at 3 (noting that MBNA achieved its success by collecting personal
information and then targeting potential customers with credit packages).
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bases all its operations on the collection and analysis of personal informa-
tion. 205 By targeting individuals with common interests, MBNA used per-
sonal information to build its customer base to fifty-one million
individuals. 20 6 MBNA's use of personal information allowed it to target
geographic markets with astounding speed.207 Professor Cate argued that
an opt-in scheme would severely affect both MBNA and consumers. 20 8
Professor Cate argued that a third party opt-in scheme would harm
MBNA because it would reduce the amount of personal information the
company received from external sources. 20 9 Cate also suggested that an
opt-in scheme, related to affiliate sharing, would adversely affect MBNA
because MBNA is organized into eight divisions for tax and logistical pur-
poses. 2 10 The perceived injuries to MBNA were attributed to the low re-
sponse rate of individuals under an opt-in scheme.2 11  U.S. West
undertook a study and determined that it took an average of 4.8 calls and
twenty dollars before an adult could be reached to give consent under an
opt-in system. 2 12 Cate argued that such an opt-in system would effectively
end MBNA's marketing approach by significantly restricting the personal
205. For a further discussion of the MBNA business model, see Cate & Staten,
supra note 203 (discussing case study of MBNA).
206. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 8 (noting that MBNA provides credit
card or loan services to fifty-one million consumers and has $89 billion in out-
standing loans).
207. See id. at 9 (stating that by acquiring information about cardholder pros-
pects, MBNA was able to target potential customers and enter market with as-
tounding speed). Also, the key to the company's success was its screening of
customer interests to identify individuals who would be likely customers. See id. at
13 (explaining why availability of personal information is necessary to maintain
competitive edge).
208. See id. at 3 (noting negative effect on businesses and consumers under
opt-in system).
209. See id. at 27 (noting that company depends on external sources to de-
velop customer leads).
210. See id. at 16-17 (noting that MBNA is divided into eight separate divisions
for tax and insurance purposes and that customers are often unaware of legal dis-
tinctions that make these divisions affiliates).
211. See id. at 18 (noting that fifty-two percent of unsolicited mail goes un-
read, leading to opt-in response rates of five to eleven percent); see also Hahn, supra
note 100, at 149 (stating that under opt-in tests, 48.2 percent of adults affirmatively
responded and shared their information).
212. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 19 (noting that in U.S. West study, it
took average of 4.8 calls to reach household and one-third of households were
never reached). Of those households that were reached, twenty-eight percent
chose to share their information, in addition to the five to eleven percent that
shared via direct mail. See id. (relating findings of U.S. West study). When cus-
tomers were asked to opt in during a call initiated by the customer, the opt-in rate
was seventy-two percent. See id. (noting significant differences resulting from opt-
in scheme).
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information available. 2 13 MBNA argued that consumers would be unable
to receive services they desire. 2 14
MBNA collected personal information to create an annual list of 800
million possible customers and then cut the list to 400 million individuals
who were likely to become customers. 2 15 The average response rate for a
direct mail credit card offer was 0.6 percent.2 16 Professor Cate reported
that if all the information used to dilute MBNA's initial list were sup-
pressed, MBNA would cut the list to 550 million instead of 400 million.2 17
MBNA argued that the inclusion of the extra 150 million potential cus-
tomers would result in a loss of eight percent of pre-tax income on each
new account over a five-year period, as MBNA reverts to a blind mass mar-
keting scheme. 218
Although Professor Cate's argument concerning the financial well-be-
ing of MBNA illustrates the importance of information in today's society, it
overstates the costs that an opt-in system would create. 219 MBNA bases its
business model entirely on the collection of personal information, which
is not representative of businesses as a whole. Although many businesses
collect personal information, few utilize it as much as MBNA does, so
MBNA can be classified as a worst-case scenario.220 Further, when calcu-
lating the potential loss to MBNA, Professor Cate assumed that an opt-in
system would prevent MBNA from acquiring any personal information. 22'
The numbers demonstrate that this is not the case because when an opt-in
scheme is initiated by telephone, the positive response rate is between
213. See id. at 20 (stating that increased cost combined with low response rate
would sharply limit organizations' ability to share their personal information lists
with MBNA).
214. See id. at 19 (stating that those who failed to opt in missed opportunities
to receive services).
215. See id. at 22 (noting MBNA business model of using personal informa-
tion to target four hundred million individuals who are likely to become
customers).
216. See id. at 37 n.42 (stating that BaiGlobal, Inc. reported that credit card
companies issued 3.53 billion credit card offers in 2000, receiving response rate of
0.6 percent).
217. See id. at 24 (noting that MBNA study revealed that without gathered
personal information, potential customer list would only be cut to 550 million).
218. See id. at 25-26 (stating that inclusion of those who would have been elim-
inated causes twenty-two percent increase in cost per account opened, which Pro-
fessor Cate translates into eight percent over five years).
219. See Givens, supra note 73, 53-55 (arguing that cost of opt-in scheme is
similar to cost of opt-out scheme).
220. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 9 (stating that by acquiring informa-
tion about cardholder prospects, MBNA was able to target potential customers and
enter market with astounding speed).
221. See id. at 19 (assuming that opt-in scheme blocks all information).
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twenty-eight and seventy-two percent.2 22 Therefore, it is likely that MBNA
would still acquire a substantial amount of the information it needed.
2 23
The costs associated with getting opt-in authorization would not be
levied against MBNA because MBNA is a third party. 224 Nevertheless,
there are cost-effective ways of getting opt-in consent.225 Furthermore, the
costs associated with achieving consent are a one-time expense, the bene-
fits of which businesses can enjoy for years ahead.2 26 This initial cost is a
small price to pay in an industry that has lost substantial revenue from
identity theft.2 27 Furthermore, with the response rate from direct mail
being miniscule, the argument that consumers will not receive the services
they desire is trivial.228 Therefore, even in a worst-case scenario, an opt-in
system allows business to continue and substantially increases consumer
protection. 22
9
B. Eliminate Unauthorized Sharing with Affiliates, Third Parties
and Marketers
Both the GLBA and HIPAA have similar flaws because they allow enti-
ties to share personal information with affiliates without consent.230 The
222. See id. at 19 n.32 (noting that residential customers opted in at rate of
twenty-eight percent when called and at rate of seventy-two percent when customer
initiated call).
223. See id. (noting high response rate possible under opt-in system).
224. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (noting third parties are not subject to
GLBA).
225. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 19 n.32 (noting that when customer
initiates transaction, opt-in rates are over seventy percent).
226. See Zielezienski, supra note 69, at 315 (noting that once customer opts in,
information can be shared).
227. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 24-25 (noting that if average re-
sponse rate were 0.6 percent, MBNA would only be able to cut its potential cus-
tomer list to 550 million instead of 400); id. at 3 (noting that MBNA handles
fifteen percent of Visa/MasterCard customers); Hoar, supra note 2, at 1425 (not-
ing that Secret Service estimated that identity theft cost financial institutions $745
million in 1997 and MasterCard reported identity fraud cost its member banks
$407 million); U.S. Postal Serv., Discount Mailing Services, at http://pe.usps.gov/
text/dmm200/discount.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) (stating that bulk rate for
first class letter can be as low as 0.275 cents when pre-sorted by carrier route). For
example, assuming that MBNA has no personal information and sends out the
extra 150 million card offers, it would cost $40.5 million in postage minus the
revenue generated by the nine hundred thousand new customers MBNA would
pick up based on average response rate. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 25
(describing MBNA response rates). Compare that figure with the fact that MBNA
loses at least $60.5 million a year through identity theft based on its fifteen percent
control of MasterCard (who lost $407 million). See id. at 3 (stating that MBNA
controls fifteen percent of Visa/MasterCard accounts).
228. See Cate & Staten, supra note 203, at 24-25 (noting response rate is 0.6
percent).
229. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting major benefit of opt-in
system).
230. See Horn, supra note 55, at 100-01 (noting that GLBA privacy provisions
do not apply to affiliates or to third parties who perform services for covered en-
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laws should be regulated by an opt-in system before the information is
disseminated. 23 1 A simple check-box card, which allows consumers to
check the affiliates with whom they would like to share their information,
could implement this system.2 32 Entities could send this card as part of
the annual privacy notice package. 233
The contractual relationships employed by both the GLBA and
HIPAA do not provide any security. 2 3 4 If a third party decides to sell the
information, there is little the consumer or covered entity can do besides
canceling the contract. 23 5 Therefore, when entities make these contrac-
tual arrangements, there should be a mandatory clause in the contract
stating that the third party is independently subject to the GLBA or
HIPAA.
23 6
HIPAA's marketing exception undercuts the law's efficacy. 237 There
seems to be no logical reason to allow marketers to have access to personal
information. 238 The information given to marketers should be limited to
names, addresses and a preferred product.23 9 Nevertheless, marketers
tity); Matthews, supra note 144, at 40-41 (recognizing that termination of business
associate agreement is extent of remedy available, if associate breaches privacy
provisions).
231. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting benefit opt-in system
brings by not requiring consumers to read through long documents).
232. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 603 (noting that easier procedures in-
clude availability of toll-free numbers, web sites and check boxes on postcards to
.facilitate process).
233. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.4(a) (2003) (requiring financial institutions to pro-
vide clear and conspicuous notice to customers, and these notices must be sent
initially as well as annually).
234. See generally Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (noting that "a financial insti-
tution may entirely circumvent [GLBA] by entering into [such] contracts with
third-party service providers").
235. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (1) (ii) (2003) (stating that if breach
cannot be reconciled, covered entity must terminate relationship).
236. See Matthews, supra note 144, at 40 (stating that HIPAA contractual provi-
sions incorporate by reference privacy standards to third party business associate).
But see 45 C.F.R. § 164.104 (2003) ("Except as otherwise provided, the standards,
requirements, and implementation specifications adopted under this part apply to
the following entities: (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A
health care provider .... "). Therefore, there is no enforcement mechanism for
third parties. See id.
237. See Scott, supra note 135, at 511 (discussing concerns raised by Health
Privacy Project concerning loopholes in marketing); see also Pandozzi, supra note
22, at 200 (arguing that third party services and marketing exceptions allow infor-
mation to flow free of privacy regulations, in reference to GLBA marketing
exceptions).
238. See Pandozzi, supra note 22, at 200 (arguing that, unknown to consumer,
third party services and marketing exceptions could theoretically allow third par-
ties to reuse information and retransfer personal information to more nonaf-
filiated third parties, thus bypassing all of GLBA privacy protections).
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should only be given personal identifiable information that is public and
should be brought under HIPAA by a contract provision. 240
C. Eliminate Social Security Numbers from All Sharing and Actively Prosecute
Companies That Make Unauthorized Disclosures
Social Security numbers are the biggest resource for identity
thieves.24 1 Consumers have become sensitive to distribution of their So-
cial Security numbers.2 42 Courts have held that a credit-reporting agency
cannot force a consumer to provide a Social Security number.2 43 A mar-
keter usually has little need for a Social Security number.244 If consumers
authorize companies to share information, the Social Security number on
a consumer's file should be protected to prevent identity theft.2 45 Privacy
advocates have suggested that institutions use an alphanumeric number
for each of their customers instead of using a Social Security number be-
cause any number can be used for file identification. 246 HIPAA hints at
this concept and requires that companies only disclose the minimum nec-
essary information. 2 47 This concept should be better defined and ex-
panded to those institutions covered by the GLBA.248
240. See Matthews, supra note 144, at 40 (stating that HIPAA contractual provi-
sions incorporate by reference privacy standards to third party business associate,
therefore, providing partial incentive for marketers to keep information they have
private or risk contract termination).
241. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing use of Social Secur-
ity numbers in identity theft).
242. See Sabol, supra note 13, at 166 (noting importance of Social Security
numbers and their large role in crime of identity theft); see also Paige Norian, The
Struggle to Keep Personal Data Personal: Attempts to Reform Online Privacy and How Con-
gress Should Respond, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 803, 805 n.14 (2003) (listing several bills
that have been proposed in Congress to protect use of Social Security numbers,
such as protecting use of Social Security numbers in commercial transactions with-
out consent).
243. See Menton v. Experian Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4687(NRB), 2003 WL
21692820, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003) (finding that Menton refused to give his
Social Security number to Experian because Experian made no promise of confi-
dentiality; thereafter Experian refused to furnish Menton with copy of his credit
report); id. at *5 (holding that nothing prevented Experian from furnishing Men-
ton with his credit report without submitting his Social Security number).
244. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing misuse of Social
Security numbers as a de facto national identifier); see also Sabol, supra note 13, at
166 (discussing attractive nature of Social Security numbers to thieves).
245. See Sabol, supra note 13, at 166 (noting that Social Security numbers are
attractive to thieves).
246. See generally Wendy Wuchek, Conspiracy Theory: Big Brother Enters the World
of Health Care Reform, 3 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 293, 295-96 (2000) (noting that
HIPAA calls for DHHS to develop national record identifier, and there have been
several proposals for this number, including keeping Social Security number, al-
phanumeric numbers, picture and biometric identifiers).
247. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing privacy require-
ments under HIPAA).
248. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k) (1) (2003) (defining financial institution as busi-
ness that is "significantly engaged" in financial activity).
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With identity theft at its highest level in history, it is readily apparent
that thieves are easily accessing personal information. 249 The FTC and
DHHS are each in charge of enforcing the GLBA and HIPAA.250 Despite
the rise in identity theft and the vast penalties available, virtually no indi-
vidual or company has been charged with violating either of the stat-
utes.251 Understandably, the FTC and DHHS may be wary of filing
charges because of the floodgate of litigation charges that could follow.
2 52
If the agencies do not feel that they can handle the flood, they should
allow a private cause of action only for egregious or intentional viola-
tions. 253 The possibility of private actions should have a strong deterrent
effect on institutions that gather personal information. 254 Effective en-
forcement is necessary to curb the proliferation of identity theft, which
otherwise will cost consumers and the financial industry billions
annually. 255
VI. CONCLUSION
Identity theft has grown to epidemic levels, and current law has
proven ineffective in correcting the problem. 2 56 Therefore, Congress
must correct the privacy provisions of the GLBA and HIPAA to protect
personal information at central sources. 2 57 Congress must amend its cur-
rent laws to prohibit third party sharing, implement an opt-in system and
restrict use of Social Security numbers.258 Identity theft will continue to
249. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing rapid rise in identity
theft).
250. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.506 (2003) (stating that Secretary of DHHS shall im-
pose penalties for violations of HIPAA); see also Centralized Complaint and Con-
sumer Education Service for Victims of Identity Theft, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 5,
112 Stat. 3007 (2003) (charging IFTC with enforcing GLBA).
251. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that there have been
millions of victims, yet few arrests).
252. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing fact that millions of
people have been victims of identity theft).
253. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting harsh penalties already
prescribed under GLBA for intentional violations).
254. See Cuaresma, supra note 74, at 514 (noting that there is little incentive
to comply because lack of private cause of action does not create threat of large
monetary damages).
255. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing enormous costs of
identity theft).
256. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing rapid rise in identity
theft).
257. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing fact that identity
thieves gather personal information from large, centralized sources).
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occur at alarming rates until the law develops an effective approach to
protecting personal information. 259
R. Bradley McMahon
259. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing soaring identity theft
levels).
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